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LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the
Estate of Patrick Duncan, deceased
JASON P. DUNCAN, a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem
ALICE DUNCAN
NOREEN DUNCAN
MICHAEL DUNCAN
TIM DUNCAN
KEVIN DUNCAN
BRIEN DUNCAN
MICHELLE BOWERS, individually and as personal representative of
the Estate of Jeffrey Bowers, deceased
JUDSON BOWERS
FLORENCE HANSON
SHELLY BOWERS
SHERRY BOWERS
MONICA HENWOOD, individually and as personal representative of
the estate of Ramon Henwood, deceased
PHYLLIS HENWOOD
OWEN HENWOOD

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation
THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL KLEINMAN
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive

Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully submit their Reply
Brief in these proceedings.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENTS OF FACT
Appellants take exception to the following "corrections
and additions" to Plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts by either Union
Pacific or the State of Utah as the same are irrelevant,
inaccurate and/or unsupported by the record on appeal.
1.

At paragraphs 5 and 6 of its Brief, Union Pacific

discusses the alleged high volume level of Patrick Duncan's car
stereo and the purported absence of evidence that he made any
effort to brake the automobile.

At best, the statements relate

to Defendants1 contributory negligence claims or rebut a showing
of proximate cause as part of Plaintiffs1 prima facie case.

They

are not, however, the least bit relevant to this Court's
consideration of the issues pending, to wit: whether the Railroad
has duties with respect to warning devices at crossings; whether
the State has sovereign immunity for decisions on such devices,
and; was there sufficient evidence to show a disputed issue of
material fact on whether the Droubay Road crossing was "extrahazardous" precluding summary judgment in Defendants1 favor.
2.

At paragraph 2 of its description of the course of

proceedings below, Union Pacific again attempts to inject into
this appeal the highly irrelevant, prejudicial and disputed issue
of Patrick Duncan's alleged substance abuse.

Judge Hansen

correctly ignored it in granting the Motions for Summary Judgment
yet Respondents continue to raise this inflammatory evidence.

Respondents1 statements on the substance abuse issue are
objectionable and irrelevant to the substantive issues pending
before the Court and should be stricken.

See, Rule 24(k), Rules

of Utah Appellate Procedure.
3.

Paragraph 2 of Union Pacificfs Brief discussing the

Droubay Road crossing and Plaintiff's alleged ability to "view
the train's approach in their peripheral vision with little or no
need to turn their heads" is not only speculative but wholly
without support in the record.

This much seems obvious by the

absence of any citation to the record.
4.

Respondents1 statements that the railroad crossing

advance warnings signs, located 305 feet South of the crossing,
where in accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices ("MUTCD") is inaccurate and disputed by the parties.

As

revealed by the Manual portion excerpted at Union Pacific's
Appendix, and as noted in the Crommelin Affidavit, the
recommended distance for a 55 m.p.h. highway is 700 feet.

300

feet is the absolute minimum distance for this road thus
substantiating Plaintiffs' claims that warning sign placement is
evidence that the Droubay Road crossing was extra-hazardous and
Defendants breached duties owed to warn of those hazards.
5.

Respondents wrongly dispute the similarity of other

accidents which occurred at the Droubay Road crossing.

As

discussed in greater detail below, the standards of similarity
applied by the courts are extremely broad, easily encompassing
the accidents relied on by Plaintiffs.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT RAILROAD HAS ONGOING OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT THE
TRAVELING PUBLIC AT DANGEROUS CROSSINGS.
A.

UNION PACIFIC HAS WAIVED ANY DEFENSE PREMISED UPON STATE OR
FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION.
Both the District Court and Court of Appeals rulings1

in favor of the Union Pacific focused on the absence of any duty
to improve warning devices at rail crossings.

Duties imposed by

long-standing Utah precedent requiring a railroad to take
additional precautions at extra-hazardous crossings were
"preempted" by the statutory scheme set forth at Utah Code Ann. §
54-4-14 et seq. which grants the Utah Department of
Transportation authority to prescribe the manner of warning
devices to be utilized at railroad crossings.

In its Brief,

Union Pacific has supplemented earlier preemption arguments by
asserting federal preemption under the Federal Rail Safety Act of
1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. § 421, et seq.

As the Railroad did not

plead state or federal preemption as an affirmative defense in
its original answer, this Court should find it barred under Rule
8(c), U.R.C.P.
Only two affirmative defenses were stated by Union
Pacific; a contributory negligence defense and a defense
attempting to shift the accident's blame to Patrick Duncan.
Nowhere is there a mention of the railroad's traditional duties

Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah
App. 1990).
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to warn the public of hazardous crossings being preempted by
either state or federal statutes which delegate authority over
warning devices to state governmental agencies such as UDOT.
Although Appellants could not find a Utah case
addressing the question of whether "preemption11 is an affirmative
defense which must be pled by Defendant or else waived, cases
under the identically worded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure are
consistent in finding that preemption of common law duties comes
within the preclusion of Rule 8(c).

5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1271 (1990).

See also. In re Air Crash

-Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado, on
November 15, 1987, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988) wherein,
under similar circumstances, the court held that preemption of
common law claims based on federal regulatory statutes (there the
Federal Aviation Act and regulations promulgated thereunder) must
be set forth as an affirmative defense or else is waived.
The argument that Union Pacific has waived a preemption
defense is particularly forceful with respect to its sudden and
unexpected reliance on federal law, in particular the FRSA.
Despite the existence of the Act prior to the fatal Duncan
accident, at this final stage of these proceedings Union Pacific
asks the Court to indulge its oversight and consider a complex
new defense.

This tardy attempt to inject new issues into the

case is not only prejudicial to Appellants but contrary to
elementary rules of appellate practice.

4

B.

NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAWS REGARDING WARNING DEVICES AT
CROSSINGS ABROGATE THE RAILROAD'S TRADITIONAL DUTIES TO TAKE
ACTION IF ON NOTICE OF DANGEROUS CONDITIONS.
1.

State Statutes.
There is little question that Union Pacific could not

entirely of its own accord place automatic crossing gates or
otherwise enhance warning devices at the Droubay Road crossing.
This would be violative of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14.

But while

acknowledging that the primary authority to designate crossing
warning devices resides with UDOT, the question posed by this
appeal is whether the absence of authority absolves Defendant
from taking other actions designed to better protect the public
at railroad crossings.

As found in the well-reasoned cases

discussed at pp. 17 through 21 of Appellants1 opening Brief, it
does not.
Contrary to Union Pacific's arguments, railroads are
frequently in a unique position to assess whether any given
crossing is hazardous.

As our facts indicate, it may have been

contacted by local government officials requesting enhanced
signage.

Railroad representatives may also be members of

surveillance teams assigned to investigate crossings.

Union

Pacific's self-deprecating statements that it lacks the expertise
to determine appropriate traffic control devices at crossings is
without support in the record and flies in the face of historical
experience.
As such, courts have imposed on railroads the
obligation to petition or urge appropriate state authorities to
5

upgrade crossing warning devices when on notice of hazardous
conditions.

See, McMinn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 716 F. Supp.

125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) and Petrove v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
Co., 436 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. App. 1989).

Authority cited by Union

Pacific stops short of relieving a railroad of its duty to
petition the governing state agency to allow additional warning
devices or take other actions designed to eliminate hazards.
Even those cases cited by Union Pacific in support of
the proposition that state law has abrogated a railroads1 duties
with respect to crossing safety offer little support for this
contention.

For instance, in Eddington v. Grand Trunk Western

Railroad Co., 418 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. App. 1987), the railroadfs
duties were not even addressed.

Instead, the court was concerned

with a county's obligations as to hazardous crossings.

Nor was

the adequacy of crossing devices challenged as an issue on appeal
in South v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819
(N.D. 1980) as Respondent alleges.

Harrison v. Grand Trunk

Western Railroad Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987), another
Michigan case relied on by Respondent actually supports
Appellants f argument.
In other words, Defendants cannot erect
additional crossing signs without proper
permission. . . however, apart from the above
provisions, Defendants still have common law
duty of due care. [citation omitted] That duty
include petitioning the proper authorities when
the railroad or the county considers warning
devices at a dangerous crossing to be
insufficient, so that the situation can be
remedied.
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Id. at 431.
Union Pacificfs attempts to explain away the
inconsistency in its state preemption argument raised by the
statutory liability imposed on railroads by Utah Code Ann. § 561-11 are equally unpersuasive.

Defendant continually asserts

that duties under this provision extend only to maintenance of
crossings while the statute itself imposes liability for damages
caused by neglect to "make and maintain good and sufficient
crossings", (emphasis added).

Furthermore, courts construing the

term "maintenance" in the context of similarly worded statutes
have found that it exceeds mere physical care and upkeep to
include questions of traffic control devices.

See, Miller v. New

Mexico Department of Transportation, 741 P.2d 1374 (N.M. 1987).
Indeed, the only means of giving effect to the clearly worded
mandate of § 56-1-11 here is to hold Union Pacific accountable
for Plaintiffs1 damages regardless of UDOT's ultimate authority
to approve crossing warning devices.
2.

Federal Statutes.
Relying on various provisions of the FRSA, Union

Pacific next argues its common law duty to maintain a safe
crossing is preempted by federal law.

Assuming, for purposes of

argument, that Union Pacific has not waived a preemption defense
by failing to plead or previously assert the same, it should
still be rejected by this court.
A proper analysis of any federal preemption defense
begins with the presumption that state law is only superceded by
7

statutes or regulations where Congress specifically intended.
This presumption is applied with particular consequence where
issues of state tort liability are involved.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).

See, Silkwood v.

See also, Rosdail v.

Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969) (state
remedies for personal injury claims not preempted by pervasive
federal regulation of air carriers).

Absent a direct conflict or

clear expression of Congressional intent to do away with tort
liability, neither of which are present here, a finding of
preemption is unwarranted.
FRSA's stated purpose of establishing uniformity among
railroad regulations, including those relevant to crossing
warning devices is not contrary to Union Pacific's duty to take
some action if on notice of hazardous conditions.

The railroad

can still notify state authorities that an upgrade in warning
devices may be required or ask permission to install upgrades.
And the railroad's involvement in the process of observing and
determining which crossings are in need of additional protection
suggests an ongoing responsibility and duty to the traveling
public consistent with imposing liability on circumstances such
as ours.

It is thus no surprise that while acknowledging FRSA to

be an effort by the federal government to improve grade crossing
safety, courts have held "it does not lessen the statutory or
common law duty of a railroad to maintain a good and safe
crossing".

Karl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 880 F.2d

68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989), citing Runkle v. Burlington Northern
8

Railroad Co., 613 P.2d 982, (Mont. 1980).

There is simply no

conflict between the duties urged by Appellants and federal
regulation which would trigger preemption.
With minor exceptions, cases cited by Union Pacific in
support of their federal preemption defense are distinguishable
and in apposite.

In Sisk v. The National Railroad Passenger

Corp., 647 F. Supp. 861 (D. Kan. 1986) the court was concerned
with preemption of local ordinances on train speed not warning
devices at crossings or common law tort liability.

Nor is

precedent on federal preemption as consistent and uniform in
support of its position as Respondent would lead the court to
believe.

See, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 760

S.W.2d 59 (Ark. 1988) (FRSA does not preempt state regulations on
clearing vegetation from railroad crossings); Phillips Petroleum
v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 390 N.E.2d 620, 622
(111. App 1979) (although state environmental regulations dealing
with railroads were preempted by FRSA, this did not extend to
areas of common law redress and tort liability); and Henry v.
District Court, 645 P.2d 1350 (Mont. 1982).
In spite of Union Pacific's comments, Karl v.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co., supra., is not only "on point"
but also the most recent federal circuit court expression on
whether the FRSA preempts a common law negligence claim arising
out of inadequate warning devices at a rail crossing.

The

opinion is well reasoned and consistent with the authority
discussed above finding that even pervasive federal regulation
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does not displace state tort law and duties thereunder.

In view

of the noted presumption, it is submitted that Marshall2 and
other cases cited by Union Pacific and its analysis of Karl are
an overly broad interpretation of the express terms of 45 U.S.C.
§ 434.3

If the Ninth Circuit in Marshall had the opportunity to

review the Supreme Court decision in Silkwood it would likely
have reached a different conclusion.
Although a federal statute or regulation will
unquestionably preempt a conflicting state rule on the identical
subject, it is a far different thing to find that laws concerning
railroad safety somehow deprive these Plaintiffs of a claim
against Union Pacific for its failure to take some action to warn
the public of a hazardous rail crossing.

Even if the Union

Pacific has not waived a preemption defense, there is no basis to
depart from longstanding precedent and statutory authority which
stand for the unequivocal proposition that railroads owe
Plaintiffs1 decedents a standard of due care to take actions at
hazardous crossings.

Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th
Cir. 1983).
3

Marshall is of dubious authority for Union Pacific's
preemption claims. The 9th Circuit specifically held the
railroad did have a duty install adequate warning devices at the
subject crossing. Comments as to a railroad's duties under other
circumstances (to wit: when local agencies had made a
determination on the adequacy of existing devices) are dictum.
720 F.2d 1154.
10

POINT II
THE STATE IS NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY
CAUSED INJURIES AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS.
A.

DECISIONS AS TO CROSSING UPGRADES DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE
EXERCISE OF A "DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION".
As the State apparently admits, the facts of our case

fall within the specific governmental immunity waiver established
by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 which permits suits to recover for
any injury caused by an unsafe or dangerous condition of any
highway or structure located thereon.

In an attempt to avoid the

statute's explicit terms Respondent argues that the decisions
-here at issue represent the exercise of a discretionary function
for which immunity is granted under § 63-30-10(1)(a).
In stating "there is no case which expressly holds that
§ 63-30-8 stands on its own and is not qualified by § 63-3010(1)(a)" the State makes a grave and misleading representation
as to the state of Utah law.

In Bigelow v. Inqersol, 618 P.2d

50, 54 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court found "since the waiver of
immunity in §§ 8 and 9 encompasses a much broader field of tort
liability than merely negligent conduct of employees within the
scope of their employment, the legislature could not have
intended that § 10, including its exceptions, should modify § § 8
and 9 . . ." (emphasis added).

(Quoting Sanford v. University of

Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah 1971)).

Any conceivable doubts

flowing from the rulings in Bigelow or Richards4 are certainly

4

Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).
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clarified by the foregoing pronouncement.

Although the Court

need not proceed to analyze if the immunity waiver under § 63-308 is subject to a "discretionary function" limitation, such an
assessment would still not affect an outcome in Plaintiff's
favor.

This court has held on numerous prior occasions that

decisions concerning the design of a traffic control system
(which must be deemed to include warning devices at rail
crossings) are not at the basic policy-making level and hence are
not the exercise of a discretionary function.

See, Andrus v.

State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road
Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972), and; Bigelow, supra.
Instead, under the criteria established in Frank v. State, they
represent decisions at an operational level.5

Furthermore, if

there were any doubts whether this decision is "policy-making" as
distinguished from "operational", summary judgment should have
been denied and a trial ordered to resolve this critical fact.
Rocky Mountain Thrift Store, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 7 84
P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
The State's attempts to distinguish safety devices at
railroad crossings and those at issue in Bigelow, Richards and
Bowen6 are unavailing and simply point out the contradictions and
confusion between the Court of Appeals decisions in Duncan and

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
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Gleave

and this Court's most recent opinions.

Funding

considerations which the Court of Appeals heavily relied upon in
rendering the opinion in Duncan v. Union Pacific are present to
the same degree in Biqelow, Richards and Bowen as in the railroad
crossing cases.

More important, since adoption of the MUTCD, all

of these decisions are guided by uniform, set standards.

As

Defendants1 own Affidavits show, prioritization of crossings for
enhancement of signal devices is made through application of a
set mathematical formula.

For this reason, the theoretical

foundation of Velasquez8, which was the basis for the Gleave and
Duncan rulings, is undermined.

See, Ostendorf v. Kenyon, 347

N.W.2d 834 (Minn. App. 1984) (where placement of warning signs is
governed by MUTCD, state's duty to warn does not represent the
exercise of a discretionary function).
B.

DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT ARE NOT
SUPPORTIVE OF THE STATE OF UTAH'S IMMUNITY DEFENSE.
Attempting to overcome the clear import of Richards,

Biqelow and Bowen, the State directs this Court's attention to a
number of cases construing the discretionary function immunity
provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), specifically
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

Not only is the FTCA distinct from

Utah's sovereign immunity scheme, but the cited cases involve
decisions far different than placement of warning devices at a

Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749
P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988).
8

Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 469 P.2d 5 (Utah

1970).
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railroad crossing.

The analogy offers scant support for

Respondent's governmental immunity defense.
First, whereas the United States has generally waived
immunity under § 2 674 of the Act, Utah has retained immunity
subject to certain enumerated exceptions, two of which apply to
our facts: § 63-30-8 for injuries resulting from a negligently
designed traffic control system, and; § 63-30-10, a broader
waiver encompassing injuries caused by the negligent act or
omission of a State employee committed within the scope of his
employment.

The importance of § 8 of Utah Act is its clear

expression of legislative intent to severely limit immunity for
highway accidents.

No such expression of congressional intent

exists under the FTCA to guide the court's decision on what
constitutes the exercise of a "discretionary function" when
assessing the adequacy of warning devices.
Nor is federal case law as clear-cut as Respondent
suggests.

Each case cited had to do with more generalized design

decisions (e.g. Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir.
1977)) while in the specific area of warning devices, courts are
less inclined to find their placement as being a protected
discretionary level decision.

This is particularly so where

compliance with the MUTCD is at issue.
In Morris v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1543 (W.D. Mo.
1984), the District Court found the government's decision
regarding a closed road warning device to involve a routine
operational level decision falling outside the discretionary

14

function exception to the FTCA, in part, relying upon application
of the MUTCD.

To the same effect is Driscoll v. United States,

525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975) where the court rejected immunity
for an alleged failure to install appropriate warning devices at
an Air Force base, and; Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872
(10th Cir. 1976) as to placement of warning signs in Yellowstone
Park.

As the decision in our case pertains to the type of device

best suited to warn motorists at the Droubay Road crossing, it is
far closer to the facts of Morris, Driscoll and Smith than the
more generalized design evaluations present in the cases cited by
Respondent.

See also, Sevier v. United States, 832 F.2d 120 (9th

Cir. 1987) (rejecting discretionary function immunity on claim
that United States was negligent in failing to erect proper speed
limit signs).
Finally, to the extent FTCA cases support a
discretionary function immunity argument, they are contrary to
Utah authority and must, therefore, be little accorded little
weight.
There is no doubt that the design of traffic warning
devices involves some degree of discretion.

"It would be

difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the matter
of its performance . . . "

W. PROSSER, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

TORTS, § 132 at 990 (4th ed. 1971).

In assessing which end of

the discretionary spectrum decisions as to traffic warning
devices fall, the Utah Supreme Court has found they do not
15

represent basic plan-making level decisions immunized from suit,
Richards v. Leavitt, supra.

To the extent Respondent's cases

under the FTCA are contrary to this finding, the only means of
adopting their rationale is to drastically overrule wellconsidered Utah precedent.

Appellants urge the Supreme Court to

continue its tradition of finding decisions on traffic warning
devices to be at the operational level and not immune as the
exercise of a discretionary function.
POINT III
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DROUBAY
ROAD CROSSING WAS flEXTRA-HAZARDOUS,f.
The many factors which support a finding that the
Droubay Road crossing was "extra-hazardous" requiring
Defendants/Respondents to take additional precautions are
discussed in Appellants1 opening Brief.9

Appellants also noted

how the issue of whether a crossing is "extra-hazardous" is not
properly the subject of summary proceedings, it typically being
reserved for jury consideration.

Nonetheless, a reply to

Respondents1 contentions that the Droubay Road crossing was not
"extra-hazardous" as a matter of law is necessary.
In particular, Respondents challenge the Affidavit of
Robert Crommelin which Appellants contend raised a genuine issue

Among them are: high speed and high volume traffic on the
roadway, including school buses; train volume and speed; a
dangerous crossing angle; inadequate placement of existing
warning signs, and; evidence of similar accidents at the
crossing. See Appellants1 Brief at p. 32 and citations to the
record thereat.
16

of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment in
Defendants1 favor.

Contrary to Respondents1 Briefs, there was

ample foundation for Mr. Crommelm's opinion that the Droubay
Road crossing was "extra-hazardous" necessitating a remand of
this proceeding for a trial on the merits.
1.

Placement of the Advanced Warning Sign.
Relying on the MUTCD, the State and Railroad argue the

advance warning sign was placed at a adequate distance away from
the crossing and hence is not evidence of its extra-hazardous
nature.

In fact, the Manual shows the minimum acceptable

distance for placement on a comparable highway to be 450 feet
which is still 50% more than the 305 feet present at Droubay Road
and greatly less than the 700 feet advised under § 2C-3.
Furthermore, even if Defendants had complied with the
Manual, it establishes only a minimum standard for safety which
the jury could still find inadequate under the circumstances of
the particular crossing.

Schaeffer v. Kansas Department of

Transportation, 608 P.2d 1309 (Kan. 1980).
2.

Other Accidents at the Crossing.
Defendants also contest Crommelin's reliance on other

accidents at the crossing to support his conclusion.

That other

accidents can support a finding of "extra-hazardous" seems
admitted by Respondents and the UDOT evaluation process as well.
The number of accidents, both actual and anticipated, is a factor
in the hazard rating index applied by surveillance teams in
recommending enhancement ot

existing warning devices.
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In the

case of Droubay Road, accidents at the crossing are precisely
what prompted a change and resulted in prioritization for
automatic crossing gates,

(R. 298).

Admittedly, before evidence of prior accidents is
admissible, the plaintiff must show they occurred under
reasonably similar, although not identical, circumstances.

The

standard is, however, very flexible and the better rule is to
allow the jury to evaluate whether the minor variations in
accidents effect an ultimate finding of extra-hazardous.

Pyle v.

Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 774 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.
1989) .

Here, Crommelin found the accidents to be reasonably

similar and Judge Hanson should not have removed this issue from
jury consideration by granting the summary judgment.
3,

Reliance on UDOT Surveillance Reports.
Aside from conducting a personal inspection of the

Droubay Road crossing, Robert Crommelin utilized allegedly
inadmissible UDOT surveillance team reports in rendering his
opinion.

As previously asserted by Plaintiffs, even if the

reports themselves are inadmissible, in accord with 2 3 U.S.C. §
409, they may, nonetheless, be relied upon by an expert witness.
See, Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence.
More important, Respondents should be deemed to have
waived any objection to this evidence as a consequence of their
own submittal of surveillance reports through various Affidavits
offered in support of their summary judgment motions.

It is

settled law that a party will waive any objection to the

18

admissibility of evidence if he later introduces the same in
support of his claims.

21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE, § 5039 (1977).

See also, Bishop v. St. John Hospital,

364 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. App. 1984) (incident report (cf.
surveillance team report) which was inadmissible under state
statute was nonetheless properly admitted where party challenging
same relied on it).

It would be highly prejudicial to permit the

State and Union Pacific to submit Affidavits incorporating the
surveillance team reports while denying Plaintiffs the
opportunity of doing so through the Crommelin Affidavit.
POINT IV
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS HOLDING AT LEAST ONE OF THESE
DEFENDANTS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AT
THE DROUBAY ROAD CROSSING.
For different reasons, both the State and Railroad
argue that sound public policy favors an absence of liability for
damages proximately resulting from inadequate warning devices at
hazardous railroad crossings.

This is clearly the net effect of

the Court of Appeals ruling in Duncan.

But as it denies an

injured party redress for negligently caused injuries and fosters
the creation or continuance of dangerous conditions by removing
the deterrent effect of tort liability, the Duncan opinion is
unsound and must be overturned.
A.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD.
As a matter of policy, Union Pacific argues they cannot

have a duty to warn the public of dangerous rail crossings
without a corresponding right to install appropriate warning
19

devices.

The fallacy here is an assumption that the only means

of discharging the duty is to place automatic crossing gates at
Droubay Road.

It ignores the option of notifying those parties

with authority to improve warning devices, petition a public
agency for the right to improve crossing safety or, perhaps,
going so far as to discontinue train service along the subject
line or bring litigation to prompt change, all options which
courts have found to be part of a railroad's common law duty of
due care towards the traveling public.

McMinn v. Consolidated

Rail Corp., supra.; Petrove v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co.,
supra., and Wells v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 363 N.E.2d
1001 (Ind. App. 1977).
Farther, the Railroad is in a unique position to
implement the important public policy of travelers' safety.

It

may have been notified of dangerous conditions by local
authorities (as occurred here).

Train crew members are also

experienced in assessing crossing hazards despite Union Pacific's
claimed lack of expertise.

Finally, Defendants1 own evidence

indicates how railroads participate in the actual decision-making
process on prioritization of crossings for enhanced signage.

All

of these facts are indicative of Union Pacific's continued duties
to take some action if on notice of a dangerous rail crossing.
B.

THE STATE OF UTAH.
By its enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, the

Legislature implicitly assumed the duty to provide parties such
as these Plaintiffs with safe railroad crossings, an obligation
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previously imposed upon Union Pacific.

In view of the

substantial body of case law assessing tort liability on
railroads for negligently caused injuries at hazardous crossings,
the Legislature must also have considered judicial and fiscal
consequences associated with this duty of due care.

To find

otherwise would grant the State immunity for negligently caused
injuries and allow parties entrusted with the public well-being
to act with impunity in determining what constitutes adequate
crossing safeguards.

Both factors weigh heavily in favor of

rejecting a sovereign immunity defense on our facts.
In order to avoid this anomalous result, the Court of
Appeals in Duncan narrowed its ruling in favor of the State by
granting immunity only to those decisions on "whether to improve
the means of warning or control at the crossing" 790 P.2d 598.
Because this neither compensates otherwise worthy injured parties
nor deters negligent conduct or foster public safety, it should
not withstand scrutiny by this court.
Implications of the challenged Court of Appeals
decision could be far reaching.

Its scope easily encompasses not

only the numerous railroad crossings in Utah but all highway or
intersection warning devices as well.

So long as UDOT provides

minimal, warning and control, the State escapes liability.

This

is certainly not what the Supreme Court had in mind with its
decisions in Bowen, Bigelow and Richards cited above.

As a

matter of public policy, the standard of "minimal effectiveness"
as espoused in Duncan v. Union Pacific is bad law.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs/Appellants
respectfully urge the Supreme Court to overturn the Court of
Appeals opinion in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, reverse
Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment in Defendants' favor and
remand this case for a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this O —'

day of February,

1991,
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

MICHAEL A. KATZ
k,
Attorneys for Plaintiff^?
Appellants

22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was mailed, postage
prepaid, thj

day of February, 1991, to the following:

Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Anne Swenson, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
J. Clare Williams, Esq.
Larry A. Gantenbein, Esq.
406 West First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Harold G.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Christensen, Esq.
Attorney General
Capital
City, Utah 84114
BURBI/DGE & MITCHELL

MICHAEL A. KATZ

24

